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Justice Blackmun's Eighth Amendment 
Pilgrimage 
D. Grier Stephenson, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If one takes Witherspoon v. Illinois 1 as a starting point, 
capital punishment has been a fixture on the docket of the 
United States Supreme Court for barely a quarter century. Two 
years after Witherspoon, Harry Andrew Blackmun became the 
Court's ninety-eighth justice.2 "For capital punishment 
lawyers," Michael Meltsner of the Legal Defense Fund observed 
in 1973, "he was a disaster."3 For those engaged in the 
courtroom campaign against the death penalty, neither 
Blackmun's record as a federal appeals judge nor his position 
* Copyright 1994 by D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., Charles A. Dana Professor of 
Government, Franklin and Marshall College; A.B. Davidson College, 1964; M.A. 
1966, Ph.D. 1967, Princeton University. Co-author of AMERICAN CONSI'ITUTIONAL 
LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES (lOth ed. 1993); editor of and 
contributor to AN ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD: ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT AND ITS JUSTICES (1991). 
1 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In an opinion by Justice Stewart, over three 
dissents, the Court held that a jury from which persons with scruples against the 
death penalty are excluded may not impose the death penalty. 
2 No uniform practice of numbering justices exists. The method used here 
counts the two repeaters (John Rutledge and Charles Evans Hughes) and the three 
associate justices who became Chief Justice (Edward D. White, Harlan F. Stone, 
and William H. Rehnquist) only once. This is the method President Clinton 
presumably used when he introduced Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg on June 14, 
1993 as the soon-to-be "107th justice." Transcript of President's Announcement and 
Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at A24. 
On April 6, 1994, Justice Blackmun publicly announced his intention to retire 
at the end of the 1993-94 Term. Aaron Epstein & Robert A. Rankin, Now, Search 
Begins to Replace Blackmun, PHILA. INQUIRER, April 7, 1994, at A1; Ruth Marcus, 
Justice Blackmun Announces Retirement, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1994, at Al. At the 
time of his announcement, Blackmun, age 85, had served as long or longer than 
all but 21 of the Court's 107 justices. Only two were older at retirement or death: 
Chief Justice Taney, who died at age 87 while on the bench, and Justice Holmes, 
who retired at age 90. 
3 MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 197 (1973). 
271 
272 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
in several Supreme Court decisions culminating in Furman v. 
Georgia4 in 1972 was good news. Yet in the Supreme Court 
Term concluding in June 1993, Blackmun voted to uphold the 
claim of the individual petitioner against the government on all 
seven occasions in which the Court issued full opinions 
involving the death penalty. 
The contrast between Meltsner's assessment and 
Blackmun's recent voting record invites investigation. What 
was Blackmun's position on the constitutionality of the death 
penalty at the time of his appointment to the Supreme Court 
and during his first years as a justice? What has been his 
position during recent Terms? In what respects has there been 
a transformation? Answers to these questions should be 
important to anyone contemplating the possibilities for change 
that judicial service brings, especially in situations where a 
constitutional question like capital punishment increasingly 
occupies the Court's agenda. 
II. BLACKMUN'S DECISIONS ON THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT 
OF APPEALS 
Joining the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in November 
1959, Blackmun was among President Dwight Eisenhower's 
last judicial appointees. Indeed, without this nomination by 
Eisenhower it is highly unlikely that Blackmun, a Republican, 
ever would have served on the Supreme Court of the United 
States.5 
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text for an 
overview of Furman. 
5 Eisenhower's two successors in the White House, Kennedy and Johnson, 
followed the practice of most of their predecessors by overwhelmingly appointing 
members of their political party to the federal courts. The Democratic percentages 
for Kennedy and Johnson were 91% and 95%, respectively. D. GRIER STEPHENSON, 
JR. ET AL., AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 542 (2d ed., 1992) (See Table 15.1 for data for 
all presidents from Cleveland (Term I) through Bush). 
Moreover, Minnesota's United States senators during the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations (Hubert Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, and Walter Mondale) were 
all Democrats. Had Blackmun not been picked by Eisenhower, the combination of 
two successive Democratic presidents and Democratic senators from Blackmun's 
home state would have been deadly to any aspirations Blackmun might have had 
for a federal judgeship during the 1960s. 
At the outset of his administration, President Richard Nixon preferred Supreme 
Court nominees with judicial experience. Since he was 60 years old when Nixon 
became president, Blackmun would probably not even have been considered for a 
vacancy on either the district or appeals courts. Thus he would not have had the 
chance to acquire even a small amount of judicial experience by the time the 
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During his ten and a half years of service on the appeals 
bench, Blackmun participated in approximately 700 cases.6 Of 
these, only nine (barely more than one percent) involved the 
death penalty: seven habeas corpus actions reviewing capital 
sentences imposed by Arkansas state courts, and two appeals 
from capital sentences imposed by federal district courts in 
Iowa and Nebraska. 7 
Blackmun's exposure as a federal circuit judge to cases 
involving capital crimes is small by contemporary standards for 
at least four reasons. First, the death penalty was 
disproportionately imposed by state courts in the South.8 Of 
the states within the Eighth Circuit, which stretches from the 
Canadian border to the Louisiana line, only Arkansas had been 
part of the Confederacy. Second, by the mid-1960s two states 
within Blackmun's circuit had abolished capital punishment 
Supreme Court nominations of southern appeals judges Haynsworth and Carswell 
had failed in the Senate. Once that happened, Nixon looked about for a Republican 
judge outside the South-publicly, at least, Nixon had given up on prospective 
southern nominees. With the backing of Chief Justice Warren Burger, a long-time 
acquaintance, Blackmun was thus one of a relatively small number of federal 
appeals judges in a position for active consideration. According to John P. Frank, 
"The Blackmun appointment was completely apolitical in the sense that, by [John] 
Mitchell's recollection, no senators were involved. Haynsworth's had been to a 
degree a senatorial appointment inspired by Senator Hollings of South Carolina, 
and Carswell's appointment had been promoted by Senator Gurney of Florida. But 
insofar as there was an outside source for the Blackmun appointment, it came 
from [Hershel] Friday, [Pat] Mahafey, and Burger." JOHN P. FRANK, CLEMENT 
HAYNSWORTH, THE SENATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 118 (1991). 
This was not the first time a judicial friendship had benefitted Blackmun. The 
occasion for his appointment to the Court of Appeals in 1959 was the retirement of 
Judge John B. Sanborn, for whom Blackmun had clerked in 1932-1933 and who 
enthusiastically supported Blackmun's candidacy for the bench 26 years later. 
Hearings on the Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to Be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1970) 
[hereinafter Hearings]. 
6 Hearings, supra note 5, at 77-134. 
7 Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) and Feguer v. United 
States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962) were the two cases involving federal 
sentences. Blackmun wrote the opinion in both. 
In addition to the nine death penalty cases, two cases raised other Eighth 
Amendment questions. An opinion written by Blackmun, Jackson v. Bishop, 404 
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), enjoined use of the strap in Arkansas prisons. With 
Blackmun joining a per curiam opinion, Harris v. Settle, 322 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 
1963), denied a challenge to living conditions in a federal prison. The death 
penalty cases considered here include only those resolved by full opinion and do 
not include summary action by the judges of the Eighth Circuit on stays of 
execution. 
8 MELTSNER, supra note 3, at 52. 
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entirely: Minnesota in 1911 and Iowa in 1965.9 Third, in the 
1960s, rules of federal habeas corpus were only beginning to 
develop to a point that would facilitate routine collateral attack 
on state convictions in federal courts. 10 Fourth, the "due 
process revolution" which accelerated the expansion of federal 
procedural rights to the states did not get underway until after 
1961.11 
Furthermore, when the Court applied more provisions of 
the Bill of Rights to the states, the justices frequently gave the 
rulings only limited retroactivity. Thus, such decisions were 
often of little help in situations where convictions had become 
final. 12 It is, therefore, not surprising to find that of the seven 
state cases Blackmun considered on habeas corpus, the 
resolution in three tumed on racial discrimination in selection 
of jurors. 13 The civil rights revolution was at least a decade 
older than the due process revolution and was therefore a more 
prominent basis for decision. The jury issue had been before 
the Supreme Court on several occasions 14 and was one of the 
most common grounds employed to attack death sentences, at 
least where the condemned person was black. 15 
A pair of cases presented a more novel claim, however; a 
statistical pattern pointing to the role of race in the imposition 
of the death penalty itself. 16 Both cases involved William L. 
9 THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 12 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967). 
10 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
11 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp and the appointment of Arthur 
Goldberg in 1962 to replace Justice Felix Frankfurter mark the start of the second 
half of the Warren Court and the "due process revolution." 
12 E.g., Johnson v. N.J., 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (limiting application of 
interrogation standards from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966), to 
defendants starting trial after the day Miranda was decided); Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U.S. 618 (1965) (denying application of the exclusionary rule to convictions 
that had become final before Mapp). 
13 Stewart v. Bishop, 403 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1968); Henslee v. Stewart, 311 
F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1963); Bailey v. Henslee, 287 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1961) 
[hereinafter Bailey l]. Blackmun wrote the court's opinion in Bailey I; the second 
case was a per curiam opinion relying on Bailey I; and in the first case Blackmun 
was part of a two-judge majority. In another case, the court remanded for a 
hearing to decide whether determination of the voluntary nature of a confession is 
to be made by the trial judge and not the jury. Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 
(8th Cir. 1965). 
14 E.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). 
15 Indeed, the courtroom assault on the death penalty was more an offshoot 
of the civil rights movement than the due process revolution. 
16 Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.) [hereinafter Maxwell 1], cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 
138 (8th Cir. 1968) [hereinafter Maxwell Ill, vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). The 
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Maxwell, a black man who had been sentenced to death in 
1962 in Garland County, Arkansas, for the rape of a white 
woman in 1961. 17 The question Maxwell raised would engage 
Blackmun again as a justice on the Supreme Court.18 The 
data in Maxwell / 19 were suggestive but not conclusive: since 
1913, all but two persons executed for rape in Arkansas had 
been black, but within the most recent 14 years, two blacks 
and two whites had been executed for the offense. Speaking for 
himself and the other judge m the majority, Blackmun 
observed: 
These facts do not seem to us to establish a pattern or 
something specific or useful here, or to provide anything other 
than a weak basis for suspicion on the part of the defense. 
The figures certainly do not prove current discrimination in 
Arkansas .... 
The defense argument goes too far and would, if taken 
literally, make prosecution of a Negro impossible in Arkansas 
today because of the existence [of] ... standards which are 
now questionable. This would effect discrimination in 
reverse. 20 
In response to Justice Goldberg's dissent to the denial of 
certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama21 suggesting that the Eighth 
Amendment bars the death penalty for rape, where life has not 
been taken or endangered, Blackmun stated: 
Despite whatever personal attitudes lower federal court 
judges as individuals might have toward capital punishment 
for rape, any judicial determination that a state's long 
existent death-for-rape statute ... imposes punishment which 
is cruel and unusual ... must be for the Supreme Court in 
the first instance and not for us.22 
Where life is concerned[,] a conclusion of this kind may 
seventh of the state death sentence cases Blackmun reviewed was Bailey v. 
Henslee, 309 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1962) [hereinafter Bailey Ill which unsuccessfully 
challenged a second trial date in an Arkansas court in a rape case. 
17 In capital cases, according to Arkansas practice at the time, unless the 
jury rendered a verdict of life imprisonment in the state penitentiary at hard 
labor, the death sentence was to be imposed. Kelley v. State, 202 S.W. 49 (Ark. 
1918). 
18 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). See infra notes 104-117 and 
accompanying text for further case discussion. 
19 Maxwell I, 348 F .2d at 328. 
20 Id. at 331. 
21 375 U.S. 889 (1963). 
22 Maxwell I, 348 F.2d at 332 (parenthetical statements omitted). 
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involve a personal reluctance for judges. We deal, however, 
with statutory provisions which are not our province, at least 
not yet ... to change. Maxwell's life therefore must depend 
upon different views entertained by the Supreme Court of the 
United States or upon the exercise of executive clemency.23 
Additional data with more sophisticated analysis by 
Professor Marvin Wolfgang of the University of Pennsylvania 
were available for the Court of Appeals when Blackmun's panel 
decided Maxwell II three years later.24 The pertinent part of 
the Wolfgang study included statistics on fifty-five rape 
convictions in nineteen Arkansas counties between 1945 and 
1960. Analysis revealed that the critical variables were the 
offender's race, the victim's race, and the sentence. Compared 
to others, black men convicted of raping white women were 
disproportionately sentenced to death. Furthermore, "no 
variable of which analysis was possible could account for the 
observed disproportionate frequency."25 
Writing for the court, Blackmun was unpersuaded because 
the record was deficient on two counts. First, the study 
included no data from Garland County, the site of the crime 
and Maxwell's trial. Second, and related to the first, no 
evidence showed "that the petit jury which tried and convicted 
Maxwell acted in his case with racial discrimination."26 Judge 
Blackmun continued: 
We are not yet ready, to condemn and upset the result 
reached in every case of a negro rape defendant in the State 
of Arkansas on the basis of broad theories of social and 
statistical injustice .... 
[W]e feel that the statistical argument does nothing to 
destroy the integrity of Maxwell's trial.27 
Short of confessions by jurors of a racially-based intent to 
discriminate, Blackmun's opinion offered little encouragement 
23 Id. at 338. Blackmun also noted that "the record before us reveals that 
the rapist of the victim here was evidently not one who failed to endanger human 
life." !d. at 332. 
24 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968) (Maxwell In. Following 
the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals on Maxwell's first habeas corpus 
petition, the Supreme Court denied review. 382 U.S. 944 (1965) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
25 Maxwell II, 398 F.2d at 143 (citing Dr. Wolfgang's testimony). 
26 !d. at 147 (emphasis added). 
27 Id. 
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to those trying to prove discrimination in a particular case. The 
opinion also rejected two additional grounds offered for 
reversal: the absence of a two-stage trial which would 
determine guilt first and the penalty later/8 and the presence 
of unbridled juror discretion to impose the death penalty. 
Yet Blackmun expressed personal doubts about the 
sentence his court left undisturbed: 
This fact makes the decisional process . . . particularly 
excruciating for the author of this opinion who is not 
personally convinced of the rightness of capital punishment 
and who questions it as an effective deterrent. But the 
advisability of capital punishment is a policy matter 
ordinarily to be resolved by the legislature or through 
executive clemency and not by the judiciary.29 
Blackmun's circuit court record on the death penalty 
suggests several conclusions. First, even though he heard a 
small number of cases involving capital punishment, Blackmun 
confronted every major argument that took shape during the 
1960s against the death penalty. Second, in Maxwell II, he 
confessed serious reservations about the morality and wisdom 
of capital punishment. Third, he was prepared to assure that 
trials resulting in the death penalty should be procedurally 
correct according to constitutional standards laid down by the 
Supreme Court. Fourth, he was unpersuaded that racial 
discrimination was a significant factor in the application of the 
death penalty. Fifth, reform or elimination of the death 
penalty, including establishment of sentencing standards, was 
the province of the legislature, not the judiciary. 
28 This procedure was a key recommendation of the American Law 
Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Also part 
of the recommendation was the stipulation that a death sentence could be imposed 
only in the absence of certain mitigating circumstances and in the presence of one 
or more enumerated aggravating circumstances. 
29 Maxwell II, 398 F.2d at 153-54 n.ll (stating that Blackmun was speaking 
only for himself and not the two judges who joined his opinion). On June 1, 1970, 
only days before Blackmun joined the Supreme Court, the Court, six to one, 
reversed the Eighth Circuit in Maxwell II but avoided the questions Blackmun had 
confronted. Instead, the majority remanded the case for reconsideration on 
Witherspoon grounds. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). Justice Stewart's 
opinion in Witherspoon had made the ruling completely retroactive. Maxwell II, 398 
U.S. at 266 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)). 
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III. BLACKMUN's SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 
Widespread opposition against the Supreme Court 
nominations of Judges Robert Bork in 1987 and Clarence 
Thomas in 1991 may tend to obscure the fact that Blackmun's 
nomination and confirmation as a justice came at the end of a 
two-year battle. When Blackmun appeared before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on April 29, 1970, the nation had recently 
witnessed a series of remarkable judicial events. The Court was 
a major campaign issue in the presidential election of 1968; 
President Johnson's nomination of Justice Abe Fortas as Chief 
Justice failed to gain the Senate's approval in October 1968; 
Fortas resigned from the bench in May 1969 under a cloud of 
impropriety; Judge Warren Burger, President Nixon's choice for 
the center chair, succeeded Chief Justice Earl Warren in June; 
in November, relying on ideological and ethical reasons, the 
Senate rejected the nomination of Judge Clement Haynsworth 
to fill the Fortas seat by a vote of 55-45;30 in April 1970, the 
Senate rejected Nixon's second choice, Judge Harrold Carswell, 
by a vote of 51-45 on grounds of ideology and competence.31 
Blackmun's selection on the heels of the Carswell debacle was 
perhaps a relief to the Senate which confirmed him 94-0 on 
May 12.32 
One examining the Blackm un hearings more than two 
decades later finds them noteworthy in at least two respects. 
First, ethical concerns were paramount. Senators wanted to 
reassure themselves that Blackmun had not made the conflict-
of-interest mistakes that had given some of them a reason to 
vote against Haynsworth.33 Second, in contrast to later 
30 Ironically, among the letters of empathy Haynsworth received after the 
vote in the Senate was one from Blackmun. "He wrote to say that he shared 
Haynsworth's anguish and disappointment and urged him not to be discouraged, 
for the federal courts needed him very badly." FRANK, supra note 5, at 99 (from a 
letter from Blackmun to Haynsworth dated November 25, 1969, in the Haynsworth 
Papers at Furman University). 
31 Not since the second presidency of Grover Cleveland in 1893 and 1894 
had the Senate rejected two nominees for the same Supreme Court vacancy. 
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 27-28 (3d ed. 1992). 
32 There is a parallel between the relative ease of Blackmun's confirmation 
in 1970 and of Anthony Kennedy's in February 1988 (by a vote of 97-0). The 
latter's nomination followed the Senate's rejection of Bork in October 1987 and the 
aborted nomination of Judge Douglas Ginsburg in November. 
33 The thesis of John Frank's book on the Haynsworth nomination is that 
the conflict-of-interest charges leveled against Haynsworth were overblown and 
were a smokescreen for ideological objections. He believes Haynsworth had done 
nothing more questionable than Blackmun: "one can only conclude that the fuss 
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hearings by the Judiciary Committee, senators queried the 
nominee via a colloquy between Blackmun and Senator Fong 
about only a single substantive issue of constitutional law,34 
capital punishment. 
Early in the afternoon of April 29, Fong asked about a 
statement the nominee recently made to a reporter: "I believe 
you stated that it might well be that the Supreme Court might 
say that the imposition of capital punishment would be ... 
cruel and unusual punishment, under the Constitution. Did 
you make that statement?"35 In reply, Blackmun referred to 
Pope and the two Maxwell cases. "In all of those cases, the 
Eighth Amendment argument was made. In each and all of 
those cases we upheld the penalty against the Eighth 
Amendment argument."36 Referring specifically to Maxwell II, 
he added: 
I made the gratuitous observation which has caused so much 
furor, that it was particularly excruciating for one who is not 
convinced of the rightness of capital punishment as a 
deterrent in crime .... It is a part of personal philosophy. I 
think the other question of the rightness of legislation, be it 
by a State legislature, or by Congress in dealing with Federal 
crimes, to impose the death penalty is an entirely different 
question .... [O]rdinarily the imposition of the death penalty 
is a matter for the discretion of the legislature. I firmly 
believe this. One of course can imagine if a Legislature were 
to impose the death penalty on a pedestrian for crossing the 
street against a red light this might be something else 
over Haynsworth on this score was pure makeweight." FRANK, supra note 5, at 
121. 
34 Several senators tried to draw from Blackmun some statements about his 
judicial philosophy, without reference to particular issues. For example, Senator 
Ervin asked Blackmun to comment on Chief Justice Marshall's observation that 
"the patriots who framed the Constitution and the people who ratified it must be 
understood to have intended what they have said." Senator Hart asked, "Do you 
agree that the work of a member of the Supreme Court by its very nature 
requires some interpretation beyond the words of the Constitution and this 
interpretation requires an understanding of the contemporary society which gives 
rise to the concrete problem that is presented?" Hearings, supra note 5, at 33, 35. 
The nominee agreed with both senators. Senator Kennedy read to Blackmun parts 
of a speech the senator had given regarding threats to civil liberties but there 
were no references to Supreme Court decisions. !d. at 36-37. Blackmun explained 
that he was "sensitive" to such matters but declined to elaborate "because I think 
some of those things are certain to come before the Court before too long." !d. at 
37. 
35 Hearings, supra note 5, at 59. 
36 !d. 
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again.37 
Senator Fong pressed further. "So you feel that at the 
present time there really is not [sic] definitive attitude as far 
as you are concerned, no very definite attitude that capital 
punishment should be abolished?"38 Blackmun responded: 
This is my personal philosophy. If I were a legislator and it 
came up, probably this is the way I would initially feel 
depending in part on any overwhelming attitude on the part 
of my constituents. But otherwise, apart from that, I start 
with the premise that this is basically a legislative 
discretionary matter. 39 
"And," queried Fong, "if the Legislature says that capital 
punishment should be imposed, you would follow that?" 
"Certainly," Blackmun replied, "with an exception perhaps in 
my pedestrian illustration."40 
Blackmun's statements in the exchange with Fong 
reflected the nominee's record as a circuit judge: he would 
adhere to established constitutional principles and would 
probably accept the dictates of the legislature in imposing the 
terms by which capital punishment would be administered. 
Reform in this area of the law was not the judiciary's task. In 
these respects, Blackmun seemed little different from some of 
those who were about to be his colleagues on the Court. 
IV. COURT NOMENCLATURE AND FIGURES 1 AND 2 
Most of the remaining sections of this article relate to 
Figures 1 and 2 which depict Blackmun's position in death 
penalty cases decided by the Supreme Court as well as the 
relative positions of Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice 
(and later Chief Justice) William Rehnquist. A case was 
included on the list involving the death penalty if one party in 
the litigation was under a death sentence. So defined, the cases 
encompassed not only those which challenged capital 
punishment itself or a particular sentencing procedure, but also 
those in which the principal issue was access to the courts (as 
with habeas corpus or standing) or a procedural issue outside 
37 Id. at 59-60. 
38 ld. at 60. 
39 !d. 
40 !d. 
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the Eighth Amendment. The latter categories were included 
because the Court's decision in each case had an obvious 
bearing on whether the convicted person lived or died. 41 
The percentages in Figures 1 and 2 represent the fraction 
of instances in which Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and 
Rehnquist, and the Court majority (usually at least five 
justices) supported the claim(s) made by the condemned person. 
Among justices, Marshall served the longest with Blackmun, 
through the 1991-1992 Term. He voted most consistently in 
favor of the claim presented by the condemned person, while 
Rehnquist voted most consistently against the claim.42 The 
lines for Marshall and Rehnquist represent therefore, the 
Court's voting extremes on death penalty issues at any 
particular time. 
The period covered by Figure 1 begins with Blackmun's 
first complete Term (1970-1971) and concludes with the 1991-
1992 Term. These Terms are grouped by "discrete court," as 
designated by a number. A discrete (or "natural") court is 
merely a period of stable membership. For example, the first 
Burger Court is 1969-1970, the Term during which the Court 
functioned with only eight justices until Blackmun was sworn 
in near its end. Figure 1 begins with the second Burger Court 
(labeled BC2) when Blackmun was fully on board. The third 
Burger Court (BC3) came about because of the appointments of 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist in place of Black and Harlan 
and lasted until Justice Douglas retired in 1975. No separate 
number was assigned when the Court was only briefly absent 
one or two justices, as happened in the fall of 1971 before 
Powell and Rehnquist came on the bench in January 1972. The 
nomenclature used here departs from the standard usage 
which refers simply to the Burger Court or the Rehnquist 
Court. 
41 For over half a century in capital cases, the Court has looked closely at 
procedural safeguards outside the Eighth Amendment, especially when they bear on 
the accuracy of trial proceedings. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) 
(overturning a capital conviction for inadequacy of counsel at the state court trial 
level). Also, since petitioners in capital cases routinely raise multiple questions, the 
fact that the Court decides a case on one question does not preclude the possibility 
that a justice's vote is influenced by one or more other questions. 
42 In death penalty cases, Justice Brennan's voting record was virtually 
identical to Marshall's. However, the graphs report Marshall's voting because he 
served a Term later than Brennan. 
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The further division into discrete courts in this article (e.g., the 
second Rehnquist Court or RC2) highlights the differences that 
may appear in the Court's response to a category of cases 
during the tenure of the same Chief Justice as one justice 
departs and another arrives. 
Except in the case of a single Term, reporting positions by 
discrete courts in Figure 1 rather than by Terms, means that 
the variation in the outcome of a single case is less likely to 
mislead the reader, especially in those Terms where only a few 
opinions were published. Even with this precaution, problems 
occur. With only two published principal opinions during the 
third Burger Court, for example, the possible percentages 
include only "0," "50," or "100." For this reason, the 
percentages must be considered in light of the number of cases 
from which they are derived. For this reason as well, Figure 2, 
which reports similar data by Term, does not begin until 1981-
1982 when there were at least four capital cases annually. 
The number of principal opinions appears below the name 
of the Court or Term and includes: all signed majority opinions, 
plurality opinions containing the judgment of the Court, and 
lengthy per curiam opinions published in cases involving the 
death penalty.43 The number of such published principal 
opinions may be slightly different from the number of cases the 
Court decided on the subject, since the justices sometimes 
resolve more than one case with a single opinion. Using 
opinions instead of cases as a base reflects more accurately the 
number of opportunities presented for the justices to take a 
position on capital punishment. 
V. BLACKMUN'S FIRST DECADE ON THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Furman v. Georgia44 and the Early Burger Courts 
As Table 1 shows, the percentage of death penalty opinions 
issued by the Court each Term did not routinely approach or 
exceed five percent of the total number of principal opinions 
until after 1982.45 Decisions in earlier cases, however, largely 
43 Cases were located by both computer-assisted and manual searches. 
44 408 u.s. 238 (1972). 
45 Given the variety of constitutional and statutory issues the Court con-
fronts annually and the nearly complete control over the cases it decides, a subject 
that consumes at least five percent of the total number of principal opinions must 
be extraordinarily important to at least four members of the bench. Indeed, after 
1982, relative to all other categories, capital cases stood an excellent chance of 
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defined the nature of disputes later cases would present. 
Furman v. Georgia remains noteworthy because the Court 
effectively invalidated virtually every death penalty statute 
then in force in the United States. Furman is almost equally 
noteworthy in two other respects. First, of the five-justice ma-
jority only Brennan and Marshall found the death penalty 
itself fundamentally at odds with the Eighth Amendment. The 
remaining three justices (Douglas, White, and Stewart) found 
capital punishment, as then administered, a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment: too much discretion in the hands of juries 
and too few standards for judges made the death sentence 
capricious and unpredictable. Additionally, Stewart disallowed 
retribution alone as a constitutionally acceptable objective of 
punishment.46 For Douglas, the extreme selectivity of the 
death penalty created an inequality because those executed 
"were poor, young, and ignorant."47 For White, the death pen-
alty was pointless as well: "the threat of execution is too atten-
uated to be of substantial service to criminal justice."48 The 
positions of White and Stewart were probably unexpected be-
cause previously they were part of a six-justice majority in 
McGautha v. California upholding a death sentence for first-
degree murder against similar arguments based on due process 
and equal protection grounds.49 
Second, the four dissenting justices (Burger, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist) not only saw no fundamental conflict 
between capital punishment and the Eighth Amendment, but 
were unpersuaded by the arguments Douglas, Stewart, and 
White found so compelling. Instead, the dissenters were willing 
to allow the states ample freedom in administration of capital 
punishment, subject to pre-Furman limitations such as those 
commanding the Court's attention. As will be noted, Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall invariably voted to vacate death sentences for all petitioners and frequently 
dissented when the Court denied certiorari. Many death penalty cases thus arrived 
at the Court already with two of the four votes needed for plenary consideration. 
Rather than competing for four of nine potential votes for review, they needed only 
two of seven. Nonetheless, because of the very large number of capital cases com-
peting for plenary review, the probability of a grant of certiorari in any single case 
was very low. 
46 Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
47 !d. at 250 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
48 !d. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
49 402 U.S. 183 (1971). In Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha, six 
justices expressly rejected the requirement of a bifurcated proceeding-one to estab-
lish the guilt of the accused and the other to set the penalty-to meet due process 
requirements. 
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enumerated in Witherspoon. For instance, during the previous 
Term, Burger and Blackmun were part of the McGautha major-
ity, but had also joined in vacating a death sentence for rape 
after the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to consider the 
application of Witherspoon because of timing. 5° 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL OPINIONS PUBLISHED 
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, 1975-1992 
Term Principal Opinions* Principal Opinions 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
(All Categories) 
159 
142 
135 
138 
149 
138 
167 
162 
163 
151 
159 
152 
142 
143 
132 
116 
110 
(Death Penalty) 
5 (3.1%) 
4 (2.8%) 
2 (1.5%) 
2 (1.4%) 
2 (1.3%) 
2 (1.4%) 
4 (2.4%) 
6 (3.7%) 
8 (4.9%) 
4 (2.6%) 
8 (5.0%) 
9 (5.9%) 
9 (6.3%) 
7 (4.9%) 
12 (9.1%) 
11 (9.5%) 
9 (8.2%) 
* Principal opinions include opinions of the Court, plurality 
opinions, and significant per curiam opinions. 
Blackmun's dissent in Furman was not only his first offi-
cial statement on capital punishment as a Supreme Court jus-
tice but also was his longest opinion in a capital case until 
1983.51 Moreover, his Furman opinion was arguably the most 
anguished expression of the tension between personal values 
50 Hunter v. Tennessee, 403 U.S. 711 (1971). 
51 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916-38 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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and professional role since Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the 
second flag salute case nearly three decades earlier.52 
Noting that capital cases "provide for me an excruciating 
agony of the spirit," Blackmun no longer hesitated, as he had 
as a circuit judge and in the Senate hearings, to express his 
true feelings over the "rightness" of the death penalty. 
I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, 
indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty .... That distaste 
is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no 
useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates 
childhood's training and life's experiences, and is not compati-
ble with the philosophical convictions I have been able to 
develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life." 
Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for 
the policy reasons argued by counsel for the respective peti-
tioners and ... the Justices who vote to reverse these convic-
tions.53 
As a judge and not a legislator, Blackmun felt obliged to 
rest any vote against the death penalty on constitutional 
grounds. Acknowledging that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes 
enlightened by a humane justice,"54 Blackmun puzzled over 
"the Court's perception of progress in the human attitude since 
decisions of only a short while ago," for measuring progress in 
human attitudes was the business of the legislative and execu-
tive branches. 
The authority should not be taken over by the judiciary in the 
modern guise of an Eighth Amendment issue . 
. . . We should not allow our personal preferences as to 
the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our 
distaste for such action, to guide our judicial decision in cases 
such as these. 55 
52 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (1943) ("It can 
never be emphasized too much that one's own opinion about the wisdom or evil of 
a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one's duty on the bench."). 
53 Furman, 408 U.S. at 405-06. It is not apparent from the opinion why the 
phrase "reverence for life" appears in quotations marks. 
54 ld. at 409 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)). 
The view of the Eighth Amendment as embodying evolving standards of treatment 
is more prominently stated in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 93-104 (1958). 
55 ld. at 410-11. 
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Elected representatives of the people are "far more conscious of 
the temper of the times, of the maturing of society, and of the 
contemporary demands for man's dignity, than are we who sit 
cloistered on this Court .... "56 
Was Blackmun contradicting himself? How could the 
Eighth Amendment "acquire meaning'' through changing public 
opinion if judges deferred to legislators as constitutionally cor-
rect barometers of the public's sense of "humane justice"? 
Blackmun may have implicitly accepted a "consensus" reading 
of the Eighth Amendment: that the Court might properly em-
ploy the Eighth Amendment against recalcitrant states of the 
union once most states had abolished capital punishment. The 
Court would follow, not lead. As a circuit judge, Blackmun had 
"no difficulty" concluding that the use of the strap as a disci-
plinary tool in the prisons of Arkansas "in this last third of the 
20th century, runs afoul of' the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause. 57 
Not only had the majority in Furman "sought" and 
"achieved an end" not justified by "history," ''law," or "constitu-
tional pronouncement,"58 but the "end" reached might have an 
unintended consequence. To eliminate the dangers flowing from 
discretion allowed to judge or jury under the laws challenged in 
Furman, Blackmun explained: 
[S]tatutes struck down today will be re-enacted ... to pre-
scribe the death penalty for specified crimes without any 
alternative for the imposition of a lesser punishment in the 
discretion of the judge or jury .... This approach ... encour-
ages legislation that is regressive ... , for it eliminates the 
element of mercy in the imposition of punishment. 59 
Statutes without discretion would be regrettable but presum-
ably not unconstitutional. 
Blackmun's opinion in Furman is revealing as a statement 
of his own views for several reasons. First, no justice is re-
quired to write a separate opinion, whether concurring or dis-
senting. Even where, as in this instance, other members of the 
Court wrote separately, Blackmun was under no obligation to 
write as much as he did, especially since he expressly joined 
56 Id. at 413. 
57 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). 
58 Furman, 408 U.S. at 414. 
59 ld. at 413. 
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the opinions written by Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist. 60 So one may fairly conclude that he 
wrote separately in order to leave no doubt about his position. 
Second, his belief in the value of judicial restraint, at least 
in the context of the Eighth Amendment, was so deeply felt 
that it apparently overrode his disdain for capital punishment. 
This would account for his discourse on the province of the 
legislature to adopt a policy he found morally repulsive and 
lacking in utility. Yet, his advocacy ofjudicial restraint was not 
all-embracing. Recall that only seven months separated pub-
lication of his opinion in Furman and his majority opinion in 
Roe v. Wade. 61 Rather, his advocacy of restraint in Furman 
probably followed from his reading of the Court's previous poli-
cy of intervention in capital punishment issues only at the 
procedural margins. 
Had Blackmun's perception of a modest Eighth Amend-
ment judicial role not been so dominant, Furman would have 
offered a relatively painless opportunity for him to infuse his 
own values into the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
Had he taken this step, however, he would have compromised 
the position he took in Maxwell II and in his exchange with 
Senator Fong. Given his acceptance of the evolutionary charac-
ter of the Eighth Amendment, no prior statement on the sub-
ject would necessarily have seemed to be binding. Mter all, his 
vote had nothing to do with the outcome in Furman: there were 
already five votes against the death penalty, at least as then 
administered. 
His Furman opinion allowed a counter explanation as well, 
although less convincing. Torn between restrained deference to 
the legislature and adherence to personal values, Blackmun 
knew that the outcome in Furman already supported the latter. 
It is surely easier to preach the virtues of judicial restraint 
when the immediate result is not the execution of the several 
hundred persons on "death row" at that time. This is the judi-
cial equivalent of having one's cake while eating it too. The 
more plausible explanation, however, is that in 1972 Blackmun 
firmly believed that the Court's role under the Eighth Amend-
ment was highly circumscribed. 62 
60 Similarly, each justice had written separately the previous Term in New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Blackmun's opinion in that 
case was the briefest of the nine; he also joined Harlan's dissent. 
61 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
62 Blackmun's votes in two non-capital Eighth Amendment cases dedded 
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Third, even had the statutes challenged in Furman sur-
vived, there is nothing in his opinion to suggest that Blackmun 
would become intensely interested in how states administered 
the death penalty. He not only refused to align himself with 
the per se views of Brennan and Marshall, but declined to join 
the more fact-based and procedurally focused opinions of Doug-
las, Stewart, and White. The latter two justices, in particular, 
left the impression that the death penalty could be constitu-
tionally applied. 
Immediate assessments of Furman's significance varied 
from columnist Tom Wicker's prediction of "a flurry of state 
laws" to Legal Defense Fund head Jack Greenberg's flat dec-
laration, "[t]here will no longer be any more capital punish-
ment in the United States."63 Prompt passage of new death 
penalty statutes in most states and the Court's next round of 
capital punishment decisions proved Wicker right. 
B. Gregg v. Georgia64 and the Fourth Burger Court 
Whereas there had been only four votes in Furman to 
sustain the death penalty statutes, seven justices voted in 1976 
to uphold in principle the revised capital sentencing schemes 
for murder in cases from Georgia, Florida, and Texas.65 In 
Gregg v. Georgia, for instance, in place of the unbridled discre-
tion particularly troubling to Stewart and White were the fol-
lowing requirements: (1) bifurcation of guilt and penalty phases 
of trial, (2) finding at least one of ten aggravating circumstanc-
es before death could be imposed, and (3) automatic review by 
the state supreme court to ensure proper application of the 
statute. Justice Stevens had by this time taken Douglas's place 
on the bench. Only Brennan and Marshall dissented, asserting 
again their categorical Eighth Amendment objection to capital 
punishment. 
Aside from his vote to uphold the Georgia statute in Gregg, 
Blackmun had nothing new to say; he merely referred to his 
dissenting opinion in Furman. If his thinking about Eighth 
Amendment limitations had changed since 1972, he supplied no 
after Furman are consistent with this explanation. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 
370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
63 MELTSNER, supra note 3, at 291. 
64 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
65 ld., 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
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clue in Gregg. He did not even comment on the constitutional 
merits of the new sentencing procedures. 
Just as discretion had been the temporary downfall of 
capital punishment in Furman, its absence could be fatal as 
well. On the same day the Court upheld the sentencing 
schemes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, a narrower majority 
(five instead of seven) struck down provisions for mandatory 
death sentences in first-degree murder cases coming from 
North Carolina and Louisiana.66 Blackmun predicted passage 
of such legislation in 1972.67 Nonetheless, he now voted to up-
hold their constitutionality, signaling that the legislature had 
chosen legitimately, if unwisely. 
Furman when combined with the five death penalty cases 
the Court decided late in the 1975-1976 Term guaranteed con-
tinued judicial entanglement with capital punishment. There 
was the Scylla of too much discretion (as condemned in 
Furman) and the Charybdis of none or too little (as condemned 
in the mandatory-sentence cases). As further litigation drew 
the dimensions of the middle ground that remained, the Court 
would determine the future of the death penalty in the United 
States. 
Of the eleven death penalty cases68 the Supreme Court 
decided during the rest of the fourth Burger Court, five are 
useful in understanding the evolution of Blackmun's Eighth 
Amendment thinking. In Roberts v. Louisiana,69 he tenacious-
ly defended the authority of legislatures to fix mandatory sen-
tences in some circumscribed instances. Roberts also marks the 
first opinion as a Supreme Court justice in which Blackmun 
delved into the facts of a capital case. 
Louisiana's first-degree murder statute invalidated in the 
previous Term provided for a mandatory death sentence if the 
killer had a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm 
and was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration 
66 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 
428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
67 Furman, 408 U.S. at 413 (predicting the reenactment of "regressive" legis-
lation that eliminates "mercy"). 
68 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 
430 (1981); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 
(1979); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) 
(petitioner Harry Roberts); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Dobbert v. Flori-
da, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Davis v. Georgia., 429 U.S. 122 (1976). 
69 431 U.S. 633 (1977). 
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of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, or anned rob-
bery.70 Now the Court confronted section two of the same stat-
ute, which mandated death when the victim was a fire fighter 
or peace officer engaged in official duties. The Court divided, as 
it had on section one, with Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist voting to affinn the sentence. Blackmun refused to 
accept the majority's decision that the earlier holding on sec-
tion one controlled section two. Nor did he regard the Court's 
summary action, favorable to the claimant in Washington v. 
Louisiana,71 as dispositive even though it involved the same 
statutory section. "I would simply inquire, as to Washington, 
whether its holding should not be overruled, now that the 
Court has had the benefit of more careful and complete consid-
eration of the issue.'172 According to Blackmun section two: 
[F]alls within that narrow category of homicide for which a 
mandatory death sentence is constitutional. 
... [I]t is evident ... that mitigating factors need not be 
considered in every case; even the per curiam continues to 
reserve the issue of a mandatory death sentence for murder 
by a prisoner already serving a life sentence.73 
Blackmun did not explain why consideration of mitigation is 
not required in every case, but one may sunnise from his 
Furman dissent that mitigation was simply not addressed by 
the Eighth Amendment. 
Blackmun did not write an opinion in Coker v. Georgia/4 
the second of the five cases. However, his position in Coker was 
probably indicative of the significant step he would take in the 
following two cases. Coker remains well-known not only be-
cause the majority of seven justices, including Blackmun, inval-
idated Georgia's death-for-rape statute but also because it was 
the first death penalty law the Court struck down on grounds 
of Eighth Amendment proportionality. 75 
In Furman, Blackmun acknowledged the evolutionary 
character of the Eighth Amendment, though he may have held 
a consensus notion 76 of the amendment's limitations. In 1963, 
70 Roberts, 428 U.S. at 327. 
71 428 U.S. 906 (1976). 
72 Roberts, 431 U.S. at 640-41. 
73 ld. at 641. 
74 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
75 ld. at 592. 
76 See supra notes 54, 56, 57, and accompanying text. 
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thirty-three states no longer allowed death as a punishment for 
rape. 77 By 1977, only Georgia still allowed death for rape, 
even though it was imposed in only about ten percent of the 
rape convictions. Georgia exceeded the deference Blackmun 
accorded the legislature in a situation well short of the jay-
walking example he had tendered to the Senate in 1970.78 
Near the end of the 1977-78 Term, Blackmun again sided 
with the majority in overturning the death penalty in Lockett v. 
Ohio79 and Bell v. Ohio.80 The cases involved felony murder 
convictions and presented similar questions. The plurality 
ruled that the Ohio statute was infirm because it limited the 
range of mitigating circumstances that the sentencer could 
consider. Blackmun justified his concurrence in each case be-
cause, where one "only aided and abetted a murder," the 
sentencer could not consider "the extent of her involvement, or 
the degree of her mens rea, in the commission of the homi-
cide."81 
He realized that his position in Coker and the Ohio cases 
placed him at odds with the hands-off approach he articulated 
in Furman: 
Though heretofore I have been unwilling to interfere with the 
legislative judgment of the States in regard to capital-sen-
tencing procedures, this Court's judgment as to 
disproportionality in Coker, in which I joined, and the unusu-
al degree to which Ohio requires capital punishment of a 
mere aider and abettor in an armed felony resulting in a 
While the meaning of "cruel and unusual" would change over time, legisla-
tures-not courts-would first reflect that change. Instead, courts would follow the 
movement of opinion reflected by the policies allowed in most states. Corrective 
action by the Supreme Court would be left for those few states out of step from 
the rest. 
77 Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889 n.1 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing to denial of certiorari). 
78 See supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text for Blackmun's reply to 
Senator Fong at his confirmation hearings. Burger and Rehnquist dissented in 
Coker; Powell concurred only in the judgment, believing that there might be some 
situations where death would be a constitutionally permissible punishment for 
rape. 
79 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
80 438 u.s. 637 (1978). 
81 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 613. In his opm10n in Lockett, Blackmun noted a 
second statutory flaw not reached by the plurality: under Ohio's rules of criminal 
procedure, a defendant pleading guilty or no contest was more likely to avoid the 
death penalty than one standing trial. Blackmun concluded that this discrimination 
was barred by United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
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fatality even where no participant specifically intended the 
fatal use of a weapon, provides a significant occasion for set-
ting some limit to the method by ,,hich the States assess 
punishment for actions less immediately connected to the 
deliberate taking of human life.82 
If Blackmun was now willing to curb legislative discretion 
when there had been no "deliberate taking of human life," 
would he nonetheless continue to distinguish judicial interven-
tion in other life-taking situations? 
Within two years, he silently answered in the negative. 
The occasion was Godfrey v. Georgia,83 when the Court revis-
ited the statute facially upheld in Gregg. Georgia allowed a 
death sentence upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an 
aggravated battery to the victim."84 Godfrey's argument was 
that the statutory provision lacked essential standards, and 
thus left too much discretion with the sentencer. A plurality, 
including Blackmun, agreed. 85 
In some cases, the state supreme court had required that 
"torture" be construed as an element of "aggravated battery," 
meaning that there had to be evidence of serious physical 
abuse of the victim before death. At Godfrey's trial, however, 
the statute had not been so limited. Moreover, there was noth-
ing in the record to indicate that Godfrey's crimes (he had shot 
and instantly killed his wife and mother-in-law) reflected a con-
sciousness more "depraved" than that of anyone else who com-
mitted murder.86 The result was arbitrary; there was no prin-
cipled basis upon which to separate murderers who deserved 
death for those who did not.87 
Blackmun's position in Godfrey, however, was not typical of 
82 [d. at 616 (emphasis in the original; citations omitted). 
83 446 u.s. 420 (1980). 
84 ld. at 422. 
85 The division in the case was six to three, with Burger, White, and 
Rehnquist dissenting. Because Brennan and Marshall held to their view that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional in all circumstances, there was only a plurality 
opinion, representing the views of the remaining four justices in the majority. Plu-
rality opinions in capital cases were therefore common where the question was the 
death penalty itself and where the majority favoring the claimant included no more 
than six justices. 
86 !d. at 425-26. 
87 !d. at 427-28. 
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his voting behavior in death penalty cases during the six Terms 
of the fourth Burger Court. In the four capital cases where the 
principal issue lay outside the Eighth Amendment, Blackmun 
sided with the claimant in each one. Where the principal issue 
involved the Eighth Amendment, by contrast, he voted for the 
claimant in only five of 13 opportunities. Overall, he remained 
significantly less disposed than the majority of the bench to 
reverse capital cases. 
VI. BLACKMUN'S SECOND DECADE 
A. The Last Burger Court 
Challenges to capital sentences increasingly occupied the 
Court's agenda after Justice Stewart's retirement and Justice 
O'Connor's arrival in 1981. Whereas there were barely three 
death penalty cases on average per Term during fourth Burger 
Court, the average number in the last Burger Court doubled to 
six per year, for a total of thirty. For the first time, Blackmun 
voted for the claimant in death penalty cases more frequently 
than did a majority of the bench. Indeed, he did so nearly twice 
as often. This pattern persisted: in every Term after 1985-86, 
Blackmun's support for the capital claimant surpassed the 
majority's. 
Among the subset of capital cases decided mainly on 
Eighth Amendment grounds, his support for claimants during 
1981 to 1986 remained thirty-nine percent. Nonetheless, the 
majority's support in this subset declined sharply, from sixty-
two percent during 1975 to 1981 down to twenty-eight percent 
during 1982 to 1986. Among the thirteen "definitional" Eighth 
Amendment cases-those not excessively fact-bound and those 
likely to be influential in shaping the Eighth Amendment-
Blackmun supported the claimant on seven occasions for fifty-
four percent support. These numbers and Blackmun's pub-
lished opinions suggest Blackmun's continued tolerance of vari-
ations in state sentencing schemes but a growing intolerance of 
departures from safeguards that were part of the Eighth Amen-
dment's core. It was also during the last Burger Court that 
Blackmun, while not denying states the authority to impose the 
death penalty, began to display skepticism over the fairness of 
its administration.88 These themes emerge from four opinions 
88 Until the 1985-86 Term, Blackmun could alternately appear strict and le-
nient in capital cases. For example, in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), he 
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he filed: two for the Court and two in dissent. 
In Spaziano v. Florida89 and Baldwin v. Alabama,90 con-
demned persons challenged sentencing procedures at variance 
with those practiced in most states. Blackmun wrote for the 
majority upholding the procedures in both cases, over the dis-
senting votes of Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. 
In Spaziano, Florida law regarded the jury's sentence in a 
capital case as advisory only. The trial judge made an indepen-
dent balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
to determine the proper punishment.91 If the judge chose 
death, the law also required explanation in writing. At 
Spaziano's trial, the jury recommended life imprisonment, but 
the judge imposed death. Spaziano argued that only the jury 
could impose the ultimate penalty. "The Sixth Amendment 
never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determi-
nation of that issue [jury determination of the death sentence]," 
Blackmun replied. 92 
Acknowledging that only two other states, Alabama and 
Indiana, allowed a judge to override a jury's recommendation of 
life imprisonment, Blackmun was "unwilling to say that there 
is any one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing 
scheme."93 The identity of the sentencer was not essential. 
What was essential was a system "that can rationally distin-
guish between those individuals for whom death is an appropri-
ate sanction and those for whom it is not .... [The system] 
must also allow the sentencer to consider the individual cir-
cumstances of the defendant, his background, and his 
crime."94 With proper safeguards these determinations could 
be made by a judge as well as by a jury. 'We see nothing that 
suggests that the application of the jury-override procedure has 
dissented when the majority excused as harmless error the trial judge's consider-
ation of the defendant's criminal record as an aggravating circumstance even 
though that was improper under state law. "The end does not justify the means 
even in what may be deemed to be a 'deserving' capital punishment situation," he 
wrote. !d. at 991. Yet in the following term he joined a seven-justice per curiam 
opinion which upheld a death sentence even though the judge relied on a factor 
(future dangerousness) unavailable to the sentencer under state law. Wainwright v. 
Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983). 
89 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
90 472 u.s. 372 (1985). 
91 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 451-52. 
92 !d. at 459. 
93 !d. at 464. 
94 !d. at 460. 
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resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death 
penalty, either in general or in this particular case."95 Indeed, 
Blackmun was "satisfied" that the Florida Supreme Court took 
its reviewing responsibility "seriously and has not hesitated to 
reverse a trial court if it derogates the jury's role."96 
In the Baldwin case, an Alabama court had condemned 
Brian Baldwin to death under a 1975 statute (repealed in 
1981), which arguably muddled the responsibilities of a judge 
and jury. Once a jury found a defendant guilty of one of certain 
offenses "with aggravation," the statute directed the jury to "fix 
the punishment at death." That "fixing," however, was not 
dispositive. The trial judge then heard evidence of aggravating 
and mitigating factors and sentenced the defendant to death or 
to life imprisonment without parole.97 
Were the jury's sentence the actual sentence, the scheme 
admittedly would violate the Eighth Amendment because of the 
absence of discretion. But what was the status of the jury's 
sentence? Was it a recommendation? What was the trial judge's 
role? Was the judge to sit in review of the jury decision? Was 
the judge to consider the jury's conclusion in arriving at the 
"final" sentence? Although Alabama's scheme was "peculiar and 
unusual," even unique among states with death penalties, and 
although its "wisdom and phraseology [were] surely open to 
question," these deficiencies proved inconsequential to the 
Court.98 
The majority rejected the dissenting view that Alabama 
had unduly complicated the sentencing judge's task with con-
fusing signals and irrelevant pressures. It was as if the jury 
was handing the judge merely one group's opinion. The judge 
was the actual sentencer. The statute was silent as to the 
weight' the judge was to give the jury decision, and the Court 
was apparently impressed by the controlling interpretation; the 
Alabama appellate courts directed the sentencing judge "to 
impose a sentence without regard to the jury's mandatory 'sen-
tence.' "99 Moreover, the judge in this case did not cite the 
jury's view as one of the !actors leading him to condemn 
95 ld. at 466. 
96 ld. at 465. 
97 Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 373-74 (1985). 
98 ld. at 389. 
99 ld. at 383-84. The Court declined to consider the validity of a scheme in 
which the judge did consider the jury's sentence as a factor in deciding to impose 
the death penalty. ld. at 386 n.8. 
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Baldwin to death. Blackmun noted in this majority opinion 
that: 
The judge, of course, knew the Alabama system and all that it 
signified, knew that the jury's "sentence" was mandatory, and 
knew that it did not reflect consideration of any mitigating 
circumstance. The judge, logically, therefore, would not have 
thought that he owed any deference to the jury's "sentence" 
on the issue whether the death penalty was appropriate for 
petitioner. 100 
Both Baldwin and Spaziano allowed Blackmun to express 
his traditional deference to legislatures in Eighth Amendment 
matters. While the Alabama and Florida schemes fell outside 
the "consensus," neither struck Blackmun as being patently 
unfair. Even the arguably mandatory tilt of the Alabama stat-
ute was far less obvious than the North Carolina and Louisiana 
laws that he found constitutionally acceptable in the wake of 
Gregg. 101 Yet, when he perceived unfairness or a clear vio-
lation of Eighth Amendment precedent, deference vanished. 
In the 1985-86 Term, Blackmun filed dissents in Cabana v. 
Bullock 102 and .Darden v. Wainwright. 103 The decision in Ca-
bana turned on an application of Enmund v. Florida, 104 
which devised a ''bright-line" rule for felony murder cases. In 
Enmund, five justices, including Blackmun, declared that the 
Eighth Amendment barred the death penalty for a participant 
in a felony murder who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to 
kill, 105 thus clarifying a point that had been obscured in 
Lockett. 
In Bullock, a Mississippi court sentenced the petitioner to 
death for aiding and abetting a murder but did not make the 
required Enmund findings. The state supreme court's review of 
100 !d. at 385-386. 
101 By the time Baldwin was decided, O'Connor had replaced Stewart, and in 
Baldwin she took a position at odds with his vote in Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976). Otherwise, the justices in Baldwin were consistent with their 
positions in Woodson, except for Powell who was part of the majority in both. 
102 474 U.S. 376, 394 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
103 477 U.S. 168, 188 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
104 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
105 Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Enmund, had already 
suggested this rule in a separate opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 613 
(1978). Blackmun's opinion in Lockett took issue with White, finding it unnecessary 
in every instance to require the presence of "actual intent" to kill. !d. at 614 n.2. 
By the time Enmund came down, Blackmun had apparently dropped the objections 
he had expressed in Lockett. 
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the conviction was likewise deficient. On these points, the 
Court agreed, but the justices parted company on how the con-
stitutional violation might be cured. For the majority, "any 
court that has the power to find the facts and vacate the sen-
tence" was in a position to satisfy Enmund. 106 For Blackmun 
in dissent, this was not enough: "only a new sentencing pro-
ceeding before a jury can guarantee the reliability which the 
Constitution demands."107 Anything less, according to 
Blackmun, would weaken the protection Enmund imposed: 
Enmund established a clear constitutional imperative that a 
death sentence not be imposed by a sentencer who fails to 
make one of the Enmund findings. The Court confuses this 
imperative with the guarantee it purports to make today that 
a death sentence will not be carried out before someone 
makes an Enmund finding. 108 
The majority was prepared to accept an appellate court's 
finding of intent to kill in place of such a finding by the trial 
court. Blackmun thought the former was not the equivalent of 
the latter: a jury's first hand view of witness credibility was 
fundamentally different from an appellate court's reading and 
interpretation of a trial transcript. Only a trial court could 
make the initial assessment of Bullock's "personal responsibili-
ty and moral guilt before deciding to send him to die."109 Of 
course, Spaziano could be read as judicial unwillingness to 
dictate sentencing procedures to the states, but Blackmun 
countered that the majority had gone too far. "That we have re-
fused 'to say that there is any one right way for a State to set 
up its capital sentencing scheme,' does not mean that there are 
no wrong ways."110 Rather, "it is far better ... to establish a 
bright-line rule requiring the findings to be made by the trial 
court, especially since the Court has failed to identify a single 
reason why a State legitimately could prefer to vest the fact-
finding function in an appellate court."111 There is no defer-
ence here: the burden rested on the state to justify a procedure, 
rather than an the claimant to overrome a prerumption of ronstitutianality. 
Later in the same Term, Blackmun's dissent in Darden v. 
106 Bullock, 474 U.S. at 386. 
107 !d. at 397 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
108 !d. at 397-98 (emphasis in the original). 
109 !d. at 407. 
110 !d. at 402 (citation omitted). 
111 !d. at 406-07 n.4. 
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Wainwright accused the five-justice majority of departing from 
the Eighth Amendment principle that there must be "a height-
ened degree of reliability in any case where a State seeks to 
take the defendant's life."112 For Blackmun, the record con-
tained two flaws that demanded that the death penalty be 
vacated: prosecutorial misconduct and exclusion of a member of 
the venire in violation of Witherspoon. On the first point, the 
Court was "willing to tolerate not only imperfection but a level 
of faimess and reliability so low it should make conscientious 
prosecutors cringe."113 
On the second point, the Court had disregarded its holding 
in Davis v. Georgia 114 in which the "improper exclusion of one 
juror renders a death sentence constitutionally infirm per 
se."115 In Darden, "the potential prejudice is palpable. Even 
though it was stripped of members expressing reservations 
about the death penalty, this jury could not agree unanimously 
that a death sentence was appropriate."u6 
Blackmun's dissents in Darden and Bullock suggest height-
ened awareness and little hesitation when reviewing capital 
sentencing. His position in Darden that "this Court must do 
more than wring its hands when a State uses improper legal 
standards to select juries in capital cases and permits prosecu-
tors to pervert the adversary process"117 was far from his def-
erence in Furman and his defensiveness in Lockett. By the end 
of the Burger Court, Blackmun seemed both surprised and 
frustrated over indifference he perceived when lives were at 
stake. 
B. The Memorandum Cases 
Blackmun's shift during the last Burger Court is also evi-
denced by his behavior in some memorandum cases in which 
the Court denied certiorari. In recent years, the Court has 
coped with the increasing number of petitions for certiorari in 
all categories through the use of a "discuss list" to determine 
which petitions would be discussed at conference. From among 
112 Darden, 477 U.S. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
113 !d. at 189. 
114 429 U.S. 122 (1976). Ironically, Blackmun had joined the dissent. !d. at 
123-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
115 Darden, 477 U.S. at 200-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Davis). 
116 !d. at 201. 
117 ld. at 206. 
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eligible cases, the Chief Justice circulates a list in advance of 
the conference containing those cases he wishes to be consid-
ered. Any associate justice is free to add cases to the list for 
discussion. If a case does not appear on the list, review is auto-
matically denied. 118 
As claimants challenged their death sentences after Gregg, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall routinely appended a brief 
dissent when the Court denied certiorari: "Adhering to our 
views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, we would vacate the death sentence in this 
case."119 Sometimes they would publish an extended dissent, 
often several pages long, highlighting aspects of the case that 
merited a grant of certiorari. 
It is reasonable to suppose that the capital cases the Court 
refused to review were on the discuss list. The points made in 
the extended dissent were probably the "talking points" at the 
conference. 120 Indeed, interviews of some justices and clerks 
conducted by H. W. Perry, Jr., revealed that, at least for the 
years 1976-1980, every capital case was on the discuss list. 121 
In other words, Court policy deemed no capital case "frivolous," 
even though the Court denied review to most of them. The 
cases with extended dissents were probably those discussed at 
greatest length during the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
As Table 2 shows, Brennan and Marshall dissented alone 
in most of these extended memorandum opinions. Nevertheless, 
Blackmun or another justice, most frequently Stevens, would 
sometimes join in that part of the dissent which explored ques-
tions other than the per se Eighth Amendment objection. 122 
118 Use of the discuss list has been widely known for some time. See, e.g., 
ALPHEUS T. MASON ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (7th ed. 1983). 
119 E.g., Woodkins v. Texas, 431 U.S. 960 (1977) (Brennan, J. and Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
120 It would have made little sense to explain in dissent one or more reasons 
why the Court should have granted certiorari if those reasons had not already 
been mentioned in conference. 
121 A pink sticker was affixed to all certiorari petitions in capital cases. H. 
W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 92-94 (1991). 
122 On denials of a stay of execution, which were also the subject of some 
memorandum cases, both Blackmun and Stevens could join Brennan and Marshall 
with no effect on the case since the four would be a minority of the bench. Most 
of the memorandum cases containing the extended dissents, however, involved an 
unsuccessful petition for certiorari by a condemned claimant; a vote by Blackmun 
and Stevens to join Brennan and Marshall in such a situation would of course 
have produced a successful petition for certiorari. 
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Of course the fact that Blackmun joined such a dissent to the 
denial of certiorari does not mean that, had the Court granted 
review, he necessarily would have voted for the claimant. It 
does strongly suggest, however, that Blackmun was not only 
aware of the nature of the petitioner's claim but thought that 
the issue was important enough to warrant plenary consider-
ation. That he joined Brennan and Marshall at least twenty-
three percent of the time after the 1984-85 Term also suggests 
that Blackmun had begun to follow questions arising in capital 
cases more closely and that he would allocate an ever greater 
amount of the Court's calendar to death penalty issues. 123 
Table 2 
MEMORANDUM CASES INVOLVING THE DEATH 
PENALTY CONTAINING AN EXTENDED DISSENT BY 
BRENNAN AND MARSHALL 
Term 
1976-1981 
1981-19825 
1982-1983 
1983-1984 
1984-1985 
1985-1986 
1986-1987 
1987-1988 
1988-1989 
1989-1990 
1990-1991 
1991-1992 
Brennan & Marshall Only* Including Blackmun 
09 
05 
13 
22 
36 
29 
22 
22 
25 
19 
15 
05 
1 (11 %) 
1 (20%) 
0 (0%) 
2 (9%) 
6 (17%) 
9 (31%) 
6 (27%) 
5 (23%) 
6 (24%) 
6 (32%) 
6 (40%) 
4 (80%) 
* Brennan retired at the end of the 1989-90 Term. The data for 
1990-91 reflect a dissent by Marshall only. Since Marshall 
retired in the summer of 1991, data in the middle column for 
1991-92 include an extended dissent by neither Brennan nor 
Marshall but by a member of the Court other than Blackmun. 
123 Table 2 also includes data from the 1990-91 Term, after Brennan's re-
tirement, and from the 1991-92 Term, after Marshall's retirement. As a measure of 
their influence, note the decline in number of extended dissents in memorandum 
death penalty cases in 1991-92. 
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C. The First Rehnquist Court 
Bounded by Chief Justice Burger's retirement, Justice 
Rehnquist's move to the center chair, and Judge Antonin 
Scalia's arrival, all in mid-1986, and Justice Powell's retire-
ment in mid-1987, the first Rehnquist Court lasted only a sin-
gle Term. In this Term nine of the principal opinions an-
nounced by the Court involved the death penalty, with seven 
based primarily on Eighth Amendment grounds. Blackmun 
voted for the claimant in each one of the nine decisions. Fur-
thermore, on three occasions, Blackmun articulated positions 
which represented significant shifts in his views. 124 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 125 the Court engaged the issue 
Blackmun had faced squarely almost two decades before as a 
circuit court judge in the Maxwell cases: racially discriminatory 
application of the death penalty. On that previous occasion, he 
voted to leave the death penalty in place. In McCleskey, he cast 
one of the four dissenting votes to set it aside. 126 Why were 
arguments, unpersuasive in 1968, now so convincing? 
Blackmun offered one explanation in his opinion, a second ba-
sis implicitly emerged from the reasoning in McCleskey, and 
experience suggested a third possibility. 
Recall the difficulty Blackmun had with Maxwell Il. 127 
Consider the novelty of the issue: had his panel accepted 
Maxwell's statistical claim, the case would have achieved land-
mark status almost instantly. 128 Moreover, the Wolfgang data 
124 There was possibly a fourth occasion as well. Blackmun was among the 
five justices, in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), who held the introduction 
of victim impact statements was not admissible in a capital trial. Booth's per se 
bar to such statements was later overruled in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 
(1991), in which Blackmun was one of three dissenters. Yet his dissent in Furman 
in 1972 included a long paragraph on the widespread harm done by murderers, in 
which he decried "the misery the petitioners' crimes occasioned to the victims, to 
the families of the victims, and to the communities where the offenses took 
place ... ." 408 U.S. at 413-14. Introduction of victim impact statements was not 
at issue in Furman. Nevertheless, by discussing the subject, Blackmun may have 
thought that such considerations could legitimately matter. 
125 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
126 It is unclear what would have remained of the death penalty in Georgia, 
had McCleskey secured a fifth vote. See id. at 365-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
127 Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968). Of the two Maxwell 
cases, the statistical argument was stronger in the second. 
128 Such a ruling would not have been called the handiwork of a "strict con-
structionist" and would probably have kept Blackmun off Nixon's list of acceptable 
nominees for the Supreme Court two years later. However, this is a comment on 
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were limited in scope and included no entries from the county 
where Maxwell was tried. Blackmun saw nothing to convince 
him that unconstitutional discrimination occurred in Maxwell's 
trial, disregarding the role racial discrimination may have 
played elsewhere in the Arkansas criminal justice system. He 
was not willing to infer discriminatory action in a single in-
stance occurring at one locale from a racially discriminatory 
pattern in other locales within the same state. 
In contrast, Blackmun found the Baldus study/29 which 
lay at the heart of McCleskey's case, both impressive and com-
pelling. 13° First, more than the Wolfgang data, the Baldus 
study looked at the race not only of the condemned person but 
also of the victim. White-victim cases were far more likely than 
black-victim cases to yield a death penalty, and within the 
former group, black defendants were far more likely to be sen-
tenced to death than white defendants. Second, the data were 
recent (1973-78) and included ample cases from Fulton County 
where the crime and McCleskey's trial occurred. Third, accord-
ing to Blackmun, the Baldus study showed a high level of so-
phistication and detail and considered more than 400 vari-
ables. 131 He was correct: the level of statistical analysis, espe-
cially in the use of multiple regression, far exceeded anything 
he had seen in the second Maxwell case. 
The Baldus study also impressed Blackmun because of the 
Court's very recent decision in Batson v. Kentucky. 132 The 
majority's vote in Batson made it much easier to prove that a 
prosecutor had used racially-based, and hence unconstitutional, 
peremptory challenges in criminal trials. Since Batson focused 
on the effects of racially discriminatory prosecutor behavior 
before a jury was ever impaneled, it was not a big leap to con-
sider prosecutorial discretion at points in a murder trial before 
the political reality of the situation when viewed after the fact. It does not suggest 
that Blackmun's action in the Maxwell cases was calculating. In fact, Blackmun 
seemed to resent being characterized as a Nixon conservative. ABRAHAM, supra 
note 31, at 309. 
As it was, Blackmun was the only member of the Court in 1987 who had pub-
lished an opinion grappling with a racial discrimination challenge to the death 
penalty. 
129 DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Em-
pirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
130 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 354 n.7. 
131 !d. 
132 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Blackmun voted with the majority to allow prima 
facie proof of racial motivation in peremptory challenges in jury selection. 
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a case moved to the penalty phase, or before it even moved to 
trial. The prosecutor would have to bring charges of first-degree 
murder and would have to ask for the death penalty before a 
jury could even deliberate the question. As Blackmun ex-
plained: 
I concentrate on the decisions within the prosecutor's office 
through which the State decided to seek the death penalty 
and, in particular, the point at which the State proceeded to 
the penalty phase after conviction. This is a step at which the 
evidence of the effect of the racial factors was especially 
strong .... "133 
The discriminating effects of prosecutorial discretion that 
Batson had highlighted thus made the evidence of racial dis-
crimination in McCleskey all the more believable. Reflection on 
prosecutorial discretion in the earlier case had apparently 
made Blackmun more aware of other stages in the criminal 
justice process that could also be corrupted by racial prejudice. 
Batson was important in a second way as well; Powell's 
majority opinion had said that "a defendant may make a prima 
facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of 
the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection 
in his case."134 There did not have to be a consistent pattern 
of official racial discrimination to find a violation of the equal 
protection clause. Batson thus overruled Swain v. Ala-
bama, 135 in which the Court refused to probe prosecutorial 
motivation in an isolated case-a constitutional violation re-
quired a pattern of race-based challenges in "case after case 
•••• "
136 While acknowledging that Batson was different, 
Blackmun also found it pertinent. "The irony is that McCleskey 
presented proof in this case that would have satisfied the more 
burdensome standard of Swain . . . , a standard that was de-
scribed in Batson as having placed on defendants a 'crippling 
burden of proof."'137 Since Batson did not exclude reliance on 
a pattern of discriminatory challenges, saying only that such a 
pattern was not a necessary condition, Blackmun seized on the 
pattern of discrimination apparent in the Baldus data as a 
133 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 351. 
134 Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (emphasis in the original). 
135 380 u.s. 202 (1965). 
136 !d. at 223. 
137 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 364. 
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substitute for the absence of proof of purposeful discrimination 
in McCleskey's case alone. 
Batson was different not merely because it involved pe-
remptory challenges but because the majority deemed the data 
from the venire selection in the defendant's own case sufficient 
for a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. In other 
words, the series of peremptory challenges in a single case 
could make a pattern. This possibility was precisely what was 
lacking in McCleskey's argument-in the nature of prosecutori-
al discretion, no single case could constitute a pattern. There 
are perhaps two or three critical decisions the prosecutor 
makes that could result in the jury's reaching the death pen-
alty. To find discrimination, one would have to infer it from 
other cases. 
The difference was now decisive: for Powell's majority 
opinion in McCleskey, the petitioner had not shown racial dis-
crimination in his isolated case. This was dispositive for 
Blackmun in 1968. It was not in 1987. For Blackmun, an indi-
vidualized showing was now unnecessary; it placed the burden 
of proof too high. "Judicial scrutiny is particularly appropriate 
in McCleskey's case because '[m]ore subtle, less consciously 
held racial attitudes could also influence' the decisions in the 
Georgia capital sentencing system."138 
A third factor might also account for Blackmun's vote in 
McCleskey: he was now an associate justice on the Supreme 
Court. It is one thing to stake out new ground as a circuit court 
judge; it is another thing to do so as a member of the highest 
court in the land, especially given the presence of Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens who were also convinced that the 
Baldus data pointed to equal protection and Eighth Amend-
ment violations. 
In contrast to McCleskey, Blackmun provided a fifth vote 
and the majority opinion in Gray v. Mississippi 139 to overturn 
a death sentence. Gray offered a chance for the Court to recon-
sider Davis v. Georgia. 140 In Davis, Blackmun, along with 
Burger, joined Rehnquist's dissent asking for plenary consider-
ation, while not fully embracing harmless error analysis for 
138 !d. (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986)). 
139 481 U.S. 648 (1987). 
140 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (vacating a death sentence by summarily holding a 
trial court misapplied Witherspoon by excluding from a capital jury a prospective 
juror who under Witherspoon would be qualified to serve). 
306 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
Witherspoon mistakes. Should there be a per se rule requiring 
vacation of the death sentence as Davis had held? Of the seven 
justices sitting in 1987 who had also taken part in Davis, only 
Blackmun's vote changed. As it had in McCleskey, prosecutorial 
discretion weighed heavily in Blackmun's opinion, probably 
accounting for the resolution of doubt that the shift in his vote 
reflected. In declining now to depart from the Davis majority 
holding, he noted one of the "real-world factors that render 
inappropriate" application of harmless-error analysis to viola-
tions of Witherspoon: 
[T]he State exercised its peremptory challenges to remove all 
venire members who expressed any degree of hesitation 
against the death penalty. Because courts do not generally 
review the prosecution's reasons for exercising peremptory 
challenges, and because it appears that prosecutors often use 
peremptory challenges in this manner, a court cannot say 
with confidence that an erroneous exclusion for cause of a 
scrupled, yet eligible, venire member is an isolated incident in 
that particular case. Therefore, we cannot say that courts 
may treat such an error as an isolated incident having no 
prejudicial effect. 141 
Thus, it was not the absence of the single improperly excluded 
venire member alone that threatened jury integrity. Rather, it 
was the probability that such an instance suggested other erro-
neous, but undetected, exclusions. 
In the same Term, the Court also revisited mandatory 
capital sentencing. In 1975, a Nevada court condemned Ray-
mond Shuman to death under a statute which specified the 
death penalty for murder committed by a prisoner serving a life 
sentence without possibility of parole. 142 After the Court's 
pair of five to four mandatory sentence rulings in Woodson and 
Roberts in 1976, the legislature repealed the statute. The ques-
tion now facing the Court was not whether the 1976 rulings 
should stand but whether Nevada's narrow exception to guided-
discretion sentencing could survive. Recall that Blackmun had 
dissented in both of the 1976 mandatory sentence decisions, 
and in the following Term he filed a dissent to the Court's deci-
sion to strike down a mandatory capital sentence in the killing 
of a peace officer. 143 Now, however, he wrote for a majority of 
141 Gray, 481 U.S. at 667-68 (footnotes omitted). 
142 Shuman v. State, 578 P.2d 1183 (Nev. 1978). 
143 Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 641 (1977) (defendant Harry Roberts, 
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six that Nevada's exception and hence Shuman's sentence were 
invalid.144 "The Nevada mandatory capital-sentencing statute 
under which Shuman was sentenced to death precluded a de-
termination whether any relevant mitigating circumstances 
justified imposing on him a sentence less than death."145 
Knowing only that Shuman was convicted of murder, commit-
ted while in prison serving a life sentence without possibility of 
parole for an earlier offense, does "not provide an adequate 
basis on which to determine whether the death sentence is the 
appropriate sanction in any particular case."146 There could 
have been other circumstances that mitigated his responsibility 
for his acts but that did not reach the level of a legal defense to 
the murder charge. 147 
His opinion in Sumner thus represents a departure from 
his past beliefs. Not only had the Nevada statute been less 
inclusive than the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes pre-
viously considered, but Blackmun was now persuaded that 
mitigation was an essential element in capital sentencing for 
any offense. "The simple fact that a particular inmate is serv-
ing a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
does not contribute significantly to the profile of that person for 
purposes of determining whether he should be sentenced to 
death."148 The same point would apply to one convicted of 
killing a peace officer or anyone else. He would not accept the 
legislative conclusion inherent in any mandatory sentencing 
statute that some offenses by their nature always outweigh any 
conceivable mitigating circumstance. 
D. The Second Rehnquist Court 
When the October 1987 Term opened, Justice Powell's seat 
remained vacant. The Court operated with eight justices until 
Anthony Kennedy was sworn in at the beginning of 1988. Be-
tween the fall of 1987 and the summer of 1990 when Justice 
Brennan retired, the Court issued twenty-eight principal opin-
ions in death penalty cases; sixteen were grounded mainly in 
the Eighth Amendment. The average number per Term was 
distinct from the 1976 Roberts decision with petitioner Stanislaus Roberts). 
144 Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). 
145 ld. at 78. 
146 ld. 
147 ld. at 78-79. 
148 ld. at 80. 
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almost identical to the number decided in 1986-87. Of the 
twenty-eight, Blackmun voted with the claimant in all but four. 
In none of those four did Blackmun's vote determine the out-
come.149 Moreover, Blackmun dissented on each of the seven 
occasions when the majority refused to consider the condemned 
petitioner's claim because of judicially-imposed limits on federal 
habeas corpus review of state court convictions. 150 
There were also at least four significant capital decisions 
during the second Rehnquist Court in which Blackmun did not 
publish an opinion. In two, 151 he provided a necessary fifth 
vote for the claimant, and was one of four dissenting justices in 
the remaining pair. 152 Opinions he wrote in another three 
cases 153 presented the opportunity to apply or to reconsider 
prior positions. 
Most of the Court's Eighth Amendment opinions since 
Furman examined sentencing standards and their application. 
In contrast, Thompson v. Oklahoma 154 dealt with the class of 
persons who could constitutionally be subjected to the death 
149 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (denying standing to a 
death row inmate's "next friend"); Hildwin v. Florida., 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (exis-
tence of a Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, a question already confronted 
in Spaziano); Franklin v. Lynnaugh, 487 U.S. 163 (1988) (adequacy of charges to 
the jury); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (adequacy of charges to the ju-
ry). 
150 See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990), which held that the 
rule of Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), dealing with police interrogations, 
was not retroactively available to support a federal habeas corpus petition. Because 
Roberson qualified as a "new rule," the result was that the state could carry out 
an execution (or any other kind of sentence) if it was valid at the time it was 
imposed, even if it could not be imposed now because of intervening decisions by 
the Court. Blackmun had already expressed frustration at the manner in which the 
majority refused to consider the merits of claims on habeas corpus. In Dugger v. 
Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989), his dissenting opinion observed that "the Court today 
itself arbitrarily imposes procedural obstacles to thwart the vindication of what ap-
parently is a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim." ld. at 412-13. Adams present-
ed a claim under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), which had disal-
lowed a death sentence imposed by a jury led to believe by the prosecutor that the 
appellate court was responsible for determining the appropriateness of a death sen-
tence, not the jury. Caldwell was one of the very few cases in which Marshall 
wrote an opinion of the Court in a capital case. 
151 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); South Carolina v. Gathers, 
490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
152 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 
U.S. 299 (1990). 
153 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 689 (1990); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 
U.S. 433 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
154 487 U.S. 815 (1988). Justice Kennedy did not participate in this five to 
three vote. 
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penalty. In Thompson Blackmun and four others concluded 
that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of one who 
was fifteen years old at the time the homicide was committed. 
Yet, when the Court decided otherwise in the following Term 
regarding those who were sixteen or seventeen, Blackmun 
found himself in a minority of four. 155 
South Carolina v. Gathers 156 tested the limits of the 
Court's holding in Booth v. Maryland, 157 by disallowing the 
use of victim impact statements during the sentencing phase of 
a capital trial. At issue were comments by the prosecutor on 
religious tracts and a voter registration card carried by the vic-
tim. Adhering strictly to Booth, Blackmun joined four justices 
in setting aside the death sentence. In a separate concurring 
opinion, White, who had dissented in Booth, noted that the 
sentence had to be vacated unless Booth itself was to be 
overruled. 158 
Blystone v. Pennsylvania 159 illustrated how firmly 
Blackmun accepted the logical implication of his opinion in 
Sumner regarding mandatory sentencing and how far he had 
moved on this question since Woodson. Five justices found no 
constitutional defect in a Pennsylvania statute that requires 
the death penalty when the jury found at least one aggravating 
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. Blackmun 
aligned himself with the dissenting view: the statute essential-
ly removed the jury's discretion once no mitigating circum-
stances were present and effectively dictated a mandatory 
sentence. 160 
When Blackmun published a death penalty opinion during 
this period, one saw the degree of scrutiny he now routinely 
applied in reviewing capital sentencing. Mills v. Maryland161 
challenged a death sentence primarily on the possibility that 
the jury relied on an unconstitutional interpretation of state 
law: that the statute required the death sentence if the jury 
155 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The critical vote was 
O'Connor's; she was part of the majority in both Thompson and Stanford. 
156 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
157 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
158 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (White, J., concurring). But see Payne v. 
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (overruling Booth as a per se bar after Brennan 
retired). 
159 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
160 !d. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
161 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
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unanimously found an aggravating circumstance but could not 
agree unanimously on the existence of any particular mitigat-
ing circumstance. As Blackmun explained in the opinion of the 
Court, "[a]ccording to petitioner's view, even if some or all of 
the jurors were to believe some mitigating circumstance or cir-
cumstances were present, unless they could unanimously agree 
on the existence of the same mitigating factor, the sentence 
necessarily would be death."162 
Also, the interpretation of the statute relied upon by Mills 
could produce no mitigating circumstances in two ways: (1) 
either eleven, but not twelve, jurors could agree on the pres-
ence of a single mitigating circumstance, or (2) all twelve could 
agree that mitigating circumstances existed but fail to agree 
unanimously on any single one of them. Either variation could 
work absolutely to cut off consideration of mitigating factors. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals offered a different construction 
which barred the death penalty as long as one juror believed 
that a mitigating factor was not outweighed by an aggravating 
factor. 163 Believing, however, that the interpretation favor-
able to the petitioner was one that jurors reasonably could have 
drawn from the instructions given to them, and since there was 
no way to know that the jurors did not rely on the unacceptable 
interpretation, Blackmun and the five-justice majority felt 
compelled to require re-sentencing. 164 
The implicit assumption in Mills was that states could not 
impose a rule of unanimity on jurors for consideration of partic-
ular mitigating factors. A test of this assumption retumed to 
the Court two Terms later in McKoy v. North Carolina, 165 in 
which six justices removed whatever doubt might have re-
mained. Capital sentencing instructions which prevent the 
sentencing jury from considering any mitigating factor on 
which the jury does not unanimously agree violate the Eighth 
Amendment. As Blackmun elaborated in a concurring opinion, 
the gravamen was not the requirement that the jury unani-
mously find mitigating circumstances, but the way the unanim-
ity rule operated-injecting arbitrariness into the process. 166 
"The extreme control given to one juror in the North Carolina 
162 ld. at 371 (emphasis in the original). 
163 ld. at 372. 
164 ld. at 384. 
165 494 u.s. 433 (1990). 
166 ld. at 445 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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scheme in effect can allow that juror alone to impose a capital 
sentence. It is that fact ... that is dispositive."167 
Blackmun was similarly troubled by Arizona's sentencing 
scheme which also made it more difficult for mitigation to enter 
into the jury's decision. In Walton v. Arizona, 168 five justices 
upheld requirements that allowed the sentencer to consider 
only those mitigating circumstances "proved by a preponderw 
ance of the evidence" and that placed on the defendant the 
burden of establishing mitigation "sufficiently substantial to 
call for leniency."169 Blackmun's dissent, joined by Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens, pointed to what he found to be the 
Court's previous insistence that the defendant be given "an unw 
restricted opportunity to present relevant mitigating eviw 
dence."170 If this opportunity was foreclosed, as Blackmun bew 
lieved to be true here, the sentencing scheme was constitutionw 
ally deficient. 
But Blackmun's Walton dissent is perhaps more significant 
for its bitter conclusion. 
Today this majority serves notice that capital defendants no 
longer should expect from this Court ... a considered exami-
nation of their constitutional claims . . . . [T]he majority 
makes only the most perfunctory effort to reconcile its holding 
with this Court's prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence .... 
Perhaps the current majority has grown weary of expli-
cating what some Members no doubt choose to regard as 
hypertechnical rules .... Today's decision is either an abdica-
tion of the Court's constitutional role, or it is a silent repudia-
tion of previously settled legal principles. 171 
167 !d. at 456. 
168 497 u.s. 639 (1990). 
169 !d. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
170 !d. at 678. Blackmun's dissent also objected to the majority's acceptance 
of Arizona's "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance despite its 
vagueness which, he believed, had not been suitably corrected by the state appel-
late courts. The Court had confronted a similar question in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U.S. 420 (1980). 
171 !d. at 708. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990), decided on the same 
day as Walton, dealt with the ambiguity of the statutory aggravating circumstance 
mentioned in the preceding note. Blackmun again wrote the dissent for Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens. His conclusion was equally bitter: "My dissenting opinion in 
Walton notes the Court's increasing tendency to review the constitutional claims of 
capital defendants in a perfunctory manner, but the Court's action in this case 
goes far beyond anything that is there observed." Lewis, 497 U.S. at 804 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Walton came up on direct review, while Jeffers came up 
on federal habeas corpus petition. 
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VII. BLACKMUN IN HIS THIRD DECADE 
A. Recent Rehnquist Courts 
[Volume 8 
The Supreme Court's two stalwart Eighth Amendment 
opponents of the death penalty, Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, retired in 1990 and 1991 respectively. The third 
Rehnquist Court therefore lasted only a single Term (1990-91), 
with David Souter in Brennan's place. The fourth Rehnquist 
Court lasted two Terms until Justice White's departure in 
1993, with Clarence Thomas in Marshall's place. Only data 
from 1991-92, however, are included in Figures one and two. 
Death penalty cases continued to occupy a prominent place 
on the docket: eleven principal opinions were issued in 1990-91, 
and nine in 1991-92. Brennan and Marshall's absence did not 
alter Blackmun's voting pattern in capital cases. In the third 
Rehnquist Court, Blackmun voted for the claimant on every oc-
casion; in the first Term of the fourth Rehnquist Court, he 
voted against the claimant only once;172 in the second year of 
the fourth Rehnquist Court, he voted in favor of the capital 
claimant every time. 
By the turn of the new decade, Blackmun had developed 
three principles to guide his approach in this area. First, "[i]n 
light of the stark finality of the death sentence, the importance 
of procedural safeguards in capital-sentencing proceedings 
cannot be overstated."173 Because death was so different from 
all other punishments both in its severity and its irrevocability, 
the Court was obliged to pay particularly close attention to any 
claim of procedural unfairness. Accordingly, he provided an 
essential fifth vote when the Court set aside a death sentence 
because at the time of the penalty hearing, the petitioner had 
been given inadequate notice that he might be condemned to 
death. 174 He cast one of two dissenting votes when the major-
ity held that a state may constitutionally establish a rebuttable 
presumption of competence and may allocate to the defendant 
172 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992), in which the Court unani-
mously rejected a prisoner's petition on habeas corpus. Blackmun, however, con-
curred only in the judgment, taking issue with the scope of the Court's "actual 
innocence" exception. Blackmun found its definition "unduly cramped." ld. at 2525. 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
173 Robertson v. California, 498 U.S. 1004, 1005 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting to denial of certiorari). 
174 Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991). 
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the burden of establishing, by preponderance of the evidence, 
one's incompetency to stand trial. 175 He declared "I do not be-
lieve a Constitution that forbids the trial and conviction of an 
incompetent pe19on tolerates the trial and conviction of a per-
son about whom the evidence of competency is so equivocal and 
unclear."176 Instead, the burden of proof should rest on the 
state. 
Blackmun's second principle was that "the Eighth Amend-
ment safeguards the capital defendant against the mere risk 
that the death sentence will be imposed arbitrarily and capri-
ciously."177 The probable presence of such risk permeated the 
opinions by Stewart, White, and Douglas in Furman from 
which Blackmun dissented; its probable absence had assuaged 
the main opinion by Stewart in Gregg which Blackmun did not 
join. Blackmun had now adopted the principle as a command 
and was one of its most ardent defenders. States had to adhere 
to rules designed to assure a rational division between convict-
ed murderers who would live and those who would die. Accord-
ingly, in Parker v. Dugger 178 Blackmun cast a fifth vote in va-
cating a death sentence when it was unclear that the Florida 
Supreme Court had conducted an independent review of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors, thus denying the prisoner the 
individualized treatment to which he was constitutionally enti-
tled. The risk, which Blackmun was presumably prepared to 
accept, was that continuous and conscientious application of 
this principle would transform the Court into a high court of 
errors. This was White's point in dissent that the degree of 
scrutiny of the record in Parker was "inconsistent with our 
precedents and with the Court's role as the final arbiter of 
federal constitutional issues of great importance."179 
These two principles led to a third: the courts of the United 
States should remain open to, and be solicitous of, state prison-
ers seeking review of federal constitutional claims on habeas 
corpus. In the late 1980s, when the Supreme Court cut back on 
opportunities for collateral review in federal courts, Blackmun 
protested vigorously. He dissented in Coleman v. Thomp-
175 Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992). 
176 !d. at 2583 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
177 Robertson, 498 U.S. at 1007 (emphasis added). 
178 498 U.S. 308 (1991). 
179 !d. at 323 (White, J., dissenting). 
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son, 180 for instance, when the majority refused to examine a 
state court decision resting on a state procedural defect that 
was independent of any federal question. For Blackmun, the 
Court was engaged in a "crusade to erect petty procedural bar-
riers in the path"181 of those pressing important constitution-
al claims. 
In its attempt to justify a blind abdication of responsibility by 
the federal courts, the majority's opinion marks the nadir of 
the Court's recent habeas jurisprudence ... [that] now rou-
tinely, and without evident reflection, subordinates funda-
mental constitutional rights to mere utilitarian interests. 182 
Blackmun's voting record matched his rhetoric. In cases 
decided since 1986 based on access to a federal forum, 
Blackmun almost always voted with the capital claimant. 183 
The reality of a less hospitable federal forum in habeas actions 
was all the more troubling since he felt that the majority had 
become insufficiently attentive to the interests of defendants on 
direct review. Because the Court traditionally preferred to 
grant certiorari in capital cases on collateral, as opposed to 
direct review, 184 he wondered whether the Court would con-
tinue to oversee the administration of capital punishment in 
any meaningful way. 
The intensity of his adherence to these principles pushed 
him to reconsider the Court's role in applying the Eighth 
Amendment. Near the end of the 1991-92 Term in Sawyer v. 
Whitley, he expressed his "ever-growing skepticism that, with 
each new decision from this Court constricting the ability of the 
federal courts to remedy constitutional errors, the death penal-
ty really can be imposed fairly and in accordance with the re-
quirements of the Eighth Amendment."185 Clarifying his early 
articulation of judicial restraint in Eighth Amendment matters, 
Blackmun explained why he had accepted constitutionality of 
180 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
181 !d. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
182 !d. at 2572-73. 
183 In a different context, Blackmun had urged an open federal forum at 
least as early as 1976: "There must be federal relief available against persistent 
deprival of federal constitutional rights even by (or, perhaps I should say, particu-
larly by) constituted authority on the state side." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 
382 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
184 Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910 (1989) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting 
the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). 
185 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2525 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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capital punishment despite his personal distaste and doubts 
that it served as an effective deterrent: 
My ability in Maxwell, Furman and the many other capital 
cases I have reviewed during my tenure on the federal bench 
to enforce, notwithstanding my own deep moral reservations, 
a legislature's considered judgment that capital punishment is 
an appropriate sanction, has always rested on an understand-
ing that certain procedural safeguards, chief among them the 
federal judiciary's power to reach and correct claims of consti-
tutional error on federal habeas review, would ensure that 
death sentences are fairly imposed. Today, more than 20 
years later, I wonder what is left of that premise underlying 
my acceptance of the death penalty .186 
Recent decisions revealed "this Court's skewed value sys-
tem, in which finality of judgments, conservation of state re-
sources, and expediency of executions seem to receive greater 
solicitude than justice and human life."187 
The continued constitutionality of capital punishment in 
the United States was thus dependent on the Court's serious 
and careful scrutiny of the claims of those persons condemned 
to die. A decline in the availability of effective review mecha-
nisms undermined "the very legitimacy of capital punishment 
itself."188 Presumably, Blackmun did not believe in 1992 any 
more than he believed in 1968, or 1972, or 1976, that capital 
punishment was inherently at odds with the Eighth Amend-
ment. If capital punishment violated the Constitution, it would 
be because of the absence of sufficient safeguards to assure 
that sentencing proceeded according to law. In his eyes, the 
Eighth Amendment's verdict on capital punishment would rest 
on diligence and efficacy: the Court's careful application of 
constitutional principles and the adequacy of those principles to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
B. 1994: The Journey's End 
What was implicit in Blackmun's thinking in 1992 became 
explicit in 1994. In a dissent from the Court's unsigned order in 
Callins v. Collins 189 on February 22, denying review in a cap-
186 ld. at 2fi29. 
187 ld. 
1H8 ld. at 2530. 
189 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994). 
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ital case from Texas, Blackmun forthrightly declared, "[T]he 
death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimina-
tion, caprice and mistake . . . . From this day forward, I no 
longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."190 He was 
now convinced that the Furman criteria, which he rejected in 
1972 but later embraced, were unattainable in practice. The 
Eighth Amendment required that capital sentencing be both 
individualized and predictable. One could be achieved only with 
the sacrifice of the other. "Experience has shown that the con-
sistency and rationality promised in Furman are inversely 
related to the fairness owed the individual when considering a 
sentence of death. A step toward consistency is a step away 
from fairness." 191 
This conclusion was unavoidable if the Court was to take 
its oversight responsibility seriously. "[F]air, consistent andre-
liable sentences of death required by the Constitution" were 
beyond the power of the Court to assure. "[T]he death penalty 
experiment had failed .... "192 While conceding the possibility 
that the Court could draw "procedural rules or verbal formulas 
that actually will provide consistency, fairness, and reliability 
. . . I am not optimistic that such a day will come."193 To pre-
tend that the Court had actually succeeded in applying con-
stitutional standards "lessens us all."194 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although Blackmun-even in his 1994 Callins declara-
tion-never adopted the per se approach of Brennan and Mar-
shall toward capital punishment, his voting in death penalty 
cases after the mid-1980s nearly matched theirs. 195 His early 
190 !d. at 1129-30 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
191 !d. at 1132. 
192 !d. at 1130-31. 
193 !d. at 1138. 
194 !d. Blackmun's opinion did not go unanswered. In a reply, Justice Scalia 
accepted Blackmun's characterization of the tension but rejected his solution. !d. at 
3546 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia reasserted a position he had announced in the 
1990 Walton decision-the Eighth Amendment did not require individualization in 
capital sentencing through wide-ranging consideration by the sentencer of mitigat-
ing circumstances. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990). 
195 To the Court's disposition of capital cases after Callins in which the jus-
tices declined to intervene, Blackmun even appended a paragraph reminiscent of 
the ones which Brennan and Marshall had appended to hundreds in the years 
after Gregg. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. "Adhering to my view that 
the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Consti-
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propensity to vote for the state in capital cases vanished. A 
comparison of his later years with his first seven years on the 
Court reveals a shift of 180 degrees in capital cases. On legisla-
tive judgments, skepticism supplanted deference; on sentencing 
procedures, concern replaced indifference; on the faimess of 
capital trials, doubt superseded confidence; on the strictures of 
the Eighth Amendment, toughness displaced permissive-
ness.196 He became an advocate for those on whom the arm of 
authority weighed most heavily. 
While this jurisprudential change was real and dramatic, 
albeit gradual, one can only infer an explanation from the re-
cord. Both as a federal appellate judge and a Supreme Court 
justice, he has eschewed grand theories of constitutional law. 
Asked by Senator Hart in 1970 what President Nixon meant 
"when he says he is looking for a strict constructionist," 
Blackmun deflected the query by replying, "I suppose the Presi-
dent would be the best man to answer that."197His answer 
may have been as personally revealing as it was politically 
deft. If Blackmun was not attracted to the Brennan-Marshall 
tution, see my dissent in Callins v. Collins .... I would grant the application for 
stay of execution and the petition for certiorari and would vacate the death sen· 
tence in this case." Callins v. Texas, 114 S. Ct. 1339, 1340 (1994) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting to denial of certiorari). 
196 Blackmun's understanding of the Eighth Amendment changed with respect 
to non-capital sentencing too. He was part of the majority in Rummel v. Estelle, 
445 U.S. 263 (1980), and in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), which upheld, 
against claims of disproportionality, a life sentence for a repeat offender who had 
defrauded people of about $230 and a 40-year sentence for possession of nine ounc-
es of marijuana, respectively. Nevertheless, Blackmun joined the majority in Solem 
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), which invalidated a life sentence without parole for 
a repeat offender whose most recent crime had been passing a bad check for $100. 
Blackmun dissented in Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), when the 
majority upheld a statute mandating a life sentence without parole on possession 
of more than 650 grams of a substance containing cocaine. 
197 Hearings, supra note 5, at 34. An editorial assessment of Blackmun pub-
lished in his hometown newspaper, the Rochester (Minn.) Post-Bulletin, on April 15, 
1970, takes on added meaning a quarter-century later. The editorial was placed on 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Record during Blackmun's nomination hearings by 
Senator Walter Mondale, who testified on Blackmun's behalf: 
There is, of course, much speculation about what kind of justice Blackmun 
will be. The White House press secretary said President Nixon considers 
him to be a strict constructionist. Judge Blackmun himself commented to 
reporters: 'I've been called a liberal and a conservative. Labels are deceiv-
ing. I call them [judicial decisions] as I see them.' Only history will tell 
what kind of label fits him. But, as he said, labels are deceiving." 
ld. at 4. 
318 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
position on the Eighth Amendment, neither did he remain long 
persuaded by his own espousal of self-restraint in Furman. 
In place of reliance on doctrine is a pragmatic and highly 
individualized approach to deciding cases that probably eased 
his movement from one "wing'' of the Court to the other in 
Eighth Amendment cases. 198 Even at the time he took his 
seat on the Court, Blackmun had already acquired a reputation 
as a fact-oriented jurise99 who viewed judging as a serious 
and painstaking craft. As a justice, he has been moved by the 
recognition that, at least in criminal matters, an individual 
stood behind every petition for review, no matter how complex 
the issues.200 
Exposure may also be a factor. From the fall of 1970 
through June of 1992, the Court issued principal opinions in 
109 capital cases and denied review in hundreds more. 
Blackmun typically confronted more death penalty cases in a 
single year on the Supreme Court than he did during his entire 
eleven years on the Eighth Circuit. Although exposure may dull 
some people's sensitivity to issues, it appears to have sharp-
ened Blackmun's. Recall that as early as 1972, he confessed 
that capital cases "provide for me an excruciating agony of the 
spirit. 201 He not only decided that his initial stance of re-
straint was unworkable but became more aware of the many 
ways in which sentencing procedures and the appellate process 
could operate unfairly. McCleskey v. Kemp 202 in particular 
highlighted the role of prosecutorial discretion, which would 
remain even when race was not involved. Blackmun thus faced 
the irony of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: 
rules sufficiently intricate to channel discretion and to identify 
rationally those murderers who deserve death also create 
countless opportunities for their violation and, accordingly, an 
expanded need for appellate oversight. 
Finally, no justice decides cases in isolation. The Supreme 
Court is a collegial institution in which all nine members not 
198 ABRAHAM, supra note 31, at 309-10. 
199 Hearings, supra note 5, at 9-10 (reporting the assessment of the American 
Bar Association's Committee on the Federal Judiciary). 
200 THIS HONORABLE COURT PART 2 (PBS television broadcast, May 9, 1988). 
See AI Kamen, Off the Bench: The High Court as 9 Human Beings, WASH. POST, 
May 2, 1988, at B1, for a discussion of the uniqueness of the conversations among 
justices featured in this program. 
201 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 406 (1972). 
202 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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only vote on almost all cases but interact intellectually and 
socially with each other as well. 203 Brennan and Marshall, 
with their fervent and fundamental opposition to the death 
penalty, may have inspired Blackmun to become an Eighth 
Amendment skeptic. Moreover, cases exist in isolation no more 
than justices do. A single Term presents an array of constitu-
tional issues. Blackmun's tenure on the Court reveals a shift 
not merely on Eighth Amendment matters but others as 
well. 204 Furthermore, in less than three years after his ap-
pointment in 1970, he became the Court's most ardent defender 
of a constitutional right to privacy. 205 It is not unthinkable to 
suppose that re-thinking or developing one's position in one 
area of the law may encourage or "cross-pollinate" reconsidera-
tion in another. In Blackmun's case, that re-evaluation without 
a doubt encompassed the Eighth Amendment.206 He became 
less hesitant to deploy federal judicial power all the while he 
became more confident of certain constitutional values and 
more at ease with the concept of a judiciary that existed to 
203 WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 31-90 (1964); Rob-
ert G. Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins of Supreme Court Leadership, 36 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 785 (1975). 
204 For example, contrast Blackmun's positions in some early and later free 
speech and equal protection cases: Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 14 (1971), with 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), with Phyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 292 (1982). Neverthe-
less, Henry Abraham's characterization of Blackmun's "readily demonstrable ... 
odyssey" in "race, gender, and religion cases" may claim too much. The statement 
might better be read as an invitation to further research-as a suggestion, not a 
conclusion. ABRAHAM, supra note 31, at 310. Abraham also credits part of 
Blackmun's shift in constitutional cases to "anger with the media's constant taunt-
ing of his erstwhile alliance with Burger" [e.g., early references to the "Minnesota 
Twins"]. ld. 
205 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
206 Blackmun's pro-government to pro-claimant shift on death penalty issues 
has not carried over to all dimensions. On search and seizure matters, for exam-
ple, compare his dissenting opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), 
with his opinion for the Court in California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991). In 
Acevedo, the majority adopted his pro-prosecution position that the majority in 
Sanders had rejected. 
Ironically, it was partly the Supreme Court's stance on criminal justice issues 
that made the Court an issue in the presidential campaign of 1968. Republican 
nominee Richard Nixon in his standard stump speech decried court decisions that 
had "gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in 
this country." A. Large, Law and Order-Into the Fuzzy Swirl, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
22, 1968, at 20. Nixon promised to correct the imbalance in making judicial ap-
pointments. If Blackmun left the "law and order" reservation on Eighth Amend-
ment issues, he has generally remained there with respect to the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
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guard individual rights. The arrival of colleagues in the 1980s 
less disposed than an earlier majority to defend civil liberties 
may have bolstered both his confidence and a sense of the 
Court's role. 
Whatever the reasons, few justices in modern Supreme 
Court history have evinced a more remarkable transformation 
in constitutional jurisprudence. Blackmun's votes and opinions 
in dozens of cases spanning more than three decades on the 
federal bench tell the story of one person's Eighth Amendment 
pilgrimage. 
